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CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT
OF PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONS*
ONE of the most confused areas of corporation law is the set of doctrines
requiring parent corporations to be "fair" in their dealings with their sub-
sidiaries, insofar as those dealings affect the interests of minority shareholders
and creditors of the subsidiaries.' The fairness of such parent-subsidiary trans-
actions is determined in accordance with corporate fiduciary doctrine, the
body of law purporting to impose the duties of a trustee on corporate control-
groups.2 To date, there has been no explicit recognition of the parent-subsidiary
relationship as a distinct doctrinal category; the parent, as such, owes no
special fiduciary duty. Rather, the rules applied to parent-subsidiary contro-
versies are those defining the duties of majority shareholders in their exercise
of control over corporate affairs, and of directors in their conduct of relations
with other companies in which they are interested.3 The confusion attending
*Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 19 App. Div. 2d 383, 243 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1963), reversing
232 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1962).
1. See Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts with Interested Directors, 61
HARV. L. REV. 335, 337 (1948).
For analytical purposes, such parent-subsidiary relationships can be recognized when a
single group of individuals controls more than one corporation whose economic and financial
operations are coordinated, whether such control is exercised through predominant voting
control by the individuals, by one corporation over others, by interlocking boards of direc-
tors or by a combination of these methods.
2. The corporate fiduciary concept has received considerable treatment from legal com-
mentators. For some of the more influential and useful interpretations, see Bra & MEtANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); Berle, Corporate Powers as
Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931); Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers
are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1365 (1932); Rohrlich, Suits in Equity by
Minority Stockholders as a Means of Corporate Control, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 692 (1933);
Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible? Tun
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46 (Mason ed. 1959); Bayne, The Fiduciary Duty of
Management - The Concept in the Courts, 35 U. DET. L.J. 561 (1958).
For a treatment of the distinctions between the fiduciary concept in its original context
and in its application to corporation law, see 1 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PHAe-
TICE § 431 (1959).
3. It was once unclear whether the same such duties could be imposed on a majority
shareholder as were required of a director. Berle, supra note 2, at 1049, 1067. Geller v.
Transamerica Corp., 63 F. Supp. 248, 251 (D. Del.) (dictum), aff'd, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir.
1945). Indeed, some commentators have even recently argued that the idealized concept
of the shareholder seems inconsistent with fiduciary status. Comment, 54 Micil. L. Rv.
971, 976 (1956). But, in parent-subsidiary cases, conceptual distinctions have not prevented
the courts from moving to thwart majority shareholders who do "in fact" exercise control
and manifest too disturbing an indifference to the interests of non-controlling shareholders
or creditors. Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919) ; Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. v. N.Y. & No. Ry., 150 N.Y. 410, 431, 44 N.E. 1043, 1049 (1896) ; Zahn v,
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). It makes no practical or legal difference
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application of these rules may be traced to three sources. First, the variety
of rules which compete for the attention of courts and lawyers has prevented
the development of a consistent scheme of decisions. Second, the applicable
doctrines themselves impede analysis, for they are derived from concepts
which ignore the structure and purpose of the usual parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship; as a result the rules have too often served, not as guides to a mean-
ingful definition of fairness, but as formulae repeated mechanically in rational-
izing intuitive conclusions.4 Finally, the rules were originated earlier in this
century; subsequently, relations within corporate systems have become char-
acterized by a high degree of economic integration, and rapacity on the part
of corporate control-groups has become less pronounced. Because the prevailing
standards of parent-subsidiary fairness have not been altered to reflect these
changes, their logic seems to lead to unsatisfactory results.5
A troublesome case pending on appeal before the New York Court of
Appeals, Case v. New York Central R.R.,G dramatizes the difficulties con-
fronting the law in this area. Suit was brought by minority shareholders in
a Central subsidiary, seeking to rescind an agreement between the two linked
corporations entered into by the Central management in their capacity as di-
rectors of both. The agreement provided for the allocation to the parent com-
pany of almost all the tax savings realized from the consolidation of the tax
returns of the two companies.7 The trial court found the allocation to be fair.
8
The Appellate Division, despite a strong dissent, reached the opposite result.
The majority justified its "dear" conviction that the allocation was not fair
by reference to the disparity between the controverted transaction and one
which would have been reached by "independent bargainers."0
The Appellate Division's approach to the challenged transaction typifies the
prevailing method of deciding parent-subsidiary controversies. In seeking
standards of fairness, the courts have most frequently drawn upon the concept
of the model contractual transaction - an agreement, isolated from any on-
going relationship, reached by independent parties. This concept has impelled
the measurement of the fairness of intercorporate dealings in terms which
refer to arm's length relationship, bargaining process, and adequacy of con-
whether the nominal defendant in a given case is the majority shareholder of the com-
plaining subsidiary or the directors appointed to assume ostensible management thereof.
Compare Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 250 U.S. 590, 599 (1921), with Seventeen
Stone Corp. v. General Telephone Co., 204 F. Supp. 885, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
4. Ward, Some Notes on Transactions Involving Interested and Interloching Directors
it Pennsylvania, 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 107, 112 (1949).
5. For elaboration of this point, see notes 41-47 infra and accompanying tex-t.
6. 19 App. Div. 2d 383, 243 N.Y.S2d 620 (1963), reversing 232 N.Y.S2d 702 (1962).
7. The majority opinion in the Appellate Division calculated the percentage taken by
Central as better than 98.5%, as opposed to the 80% Central would have received in divi-
dends as majority shareholder of the subsidiary, had the latter "kept" all the savings to
itself. 19 App. Div. 2d 383, 385, 243 N.Y.S.2d 620, 622.
8. 232 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1962).
9. 19 App. Div. 2d 383, 386, 243 N.Y.S2d 620, 623.
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sideration. 10 The principal doctrine derived from the concept of the model
contractual transaction is:
. . . whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries
the earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If it does not, equity will set
it aside.1
In fact, the transactions disputed in parent-subsidiary cases are neither bar-
gains, nor, much less, are they conducted at arm's length; rather, they are
the product of decisions made by the single group in control of both corpora-
tions. Thus, the basic premise of the arm's length test - two independent
parties with approximate bargaining equality - is at odds with the reality
of the parent-subsidiary relationship, and ignores the economic leverage and
decision making power possessed by the control group. The question presented
by each case is whether the result of the imposed decision was fair to the
plaintiff, a question not to be equated with that posed by the arm's length
test: whether that result would have been achieved within the structure of
an arm's length relationship and via a process of bargaining.12 As a conse-
quence of these conceptual inadequacies, the rule has not functioned as a
genuine test of the fairness of dealings between parent and subsidiary corpora-
tions. Rather, because of its inherent bias in favor of the dominated unit in
intercorporate transactions, it has served principally as a means of rationalizing
decisions against defendant control-groups.18
On the other hand, the inadequacy of the arm's length test has also per-
mitted its manipulation for the advantage of defendants. Thus, in situations
where it is impossible to state precisely what the result of an arm's length
agreement would have been, some courts have used this fact as a basis for
dismissing plaintiff's claim.14 Although the alleged impossibility of proof may
10. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda
Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921) ; Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64, 75
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp. 19 Ill. 2d 268, 283, 166 N.E.2d
793, 801 (1960), and cases cited therein; Ripley v. International Rys., 8 App. Div. 2d 310,
319, 188 N.Y.S2d 62, 72 (1959), af'd, 8 N.Y.2d 430, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289, 171 N.E2d 443
(1960).
11. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) (Douglas, J.).
12. As used in this Note, the term "result" means the distribution of the proceeds
among the parties to a transaction. "Structure" refers to the relation of power and func-
tion between the parties conditioning the transaction - whether they face each other from
positions of mutual independence, or whether and to what extent and for what purposes
power is vested predominantly in the hands of one. "Process" signifies the manner in which
the transaction is guided to its close.
13. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
14. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 206 F.2d 495, 499-500 (9th
Cir. 1953). For an attempt to rationalize the doctrine for purposes of solving this problem,
see Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry., 78 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (L, Hand, J.). In the
Wcstern Pacific case, supra, the court affirmed dismissal of a claim involving the appro-
priation of tax-savings by a controlling company, similar to the claim in Case v. N c
York Central. The Ninth Circuit decision, handed down following remand from the Su-
preme Court for rehearing of a procedural issue, controverted remarks made by justice
[Vol, ?4: 338
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be the result of mere absence of objective standards, such as market value,
on which to base a determination of adequacy of consideration, it is more
likely that courts find it impossible to picture independent parties engaging
in the types of transactions typical in the complex scheme of parent-subsidiary
relations.1 5
A second test of fairness derived from the model of the contractual transac-
tion is that of fraud, the presence of which is considered ground for the in-
validation of a contract.16 Crucial as this doctrine may be to the lav of con-
tract, it is often inapposite in the type of situations arising in parent-subsidiary
cases. While the concept of fraud denotes deception, where there is but one
genuine actor - the group controlling both parent and subsidiary - there
can be no one to deceive or to influence to act to his own detriment. Generally,
the degree to which the defendant has disclosed material facts or purposes
pertinent to the transaction is not at issue - it is the use of his monopoly
of power, possession of which makes concealment unnecessary for the attain-
ment of his ends.- Since fraud is as unlikely to appear in the facts of a parent-
subsidiary dispute as is a genuine arm's length bargain, invocation of the rule
that contracts cannot be set aside unless "actual" fraud is alleged and proven
places in plaintiff's path an obstacle which is literally insurmountable. Conse-
quently, this rule has served as a convenient instrument for courts wishing
to uphold challenged transactions.1 s
Jackson, dissenting. He had justified his conclusion that the claim ought to be allowed via
arm's length analysis: "Each corporation... had a bargaining position. The stakes vere
high. Neither could win them alone, although each had an indispensable something that
the other was without... Each of these parties had but one key, and how can it be said
that the holder of the other key had nothing worth bargaining for?" Western Pac. R1..
Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 277 (1953) (dissenting opinion). To this
contention, the collective wisdom of the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, demurred, and
turned Justice Jackson's argument on its head: "How could the court remake the contract
for the parties? How could this court ... determine what fair arm's length bargaining
would probably have yielded .... Such activity is a matter of business administration and
is not a judicial function." 206 F2d 495, 499-500.
15. See, e.g., the transaction challenged in the Western Pacific case, supra note 14;
or Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry., 78 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See also Case v. New
York Central R.RT, 19 App. Div. 2d 383, 388, 243 N.Y.S2d 620, 627 (1963) (dissenting
opinion).
16. Skelly v. Dockweiler, 75 F. Supp. 11, 14 (S.D. Cal. 1947) ; Briggs v. Scripps, 13
Cal. App. 2d 43, 45, 56 P.2d 277, 278 (1936); Eighteen Fulton St. Corp. v. Appel, 272
App. Div. 602, 603, 74 N.Y.S2d 17, 18 (1947); Barnes v. Atlantic Cement Prods., Inc.,
39 N.Y.S.2d 699, 727 (Sup. Ct 1942).
17. While actual fraud is assuredly possible within the context of a parent-subsidiary
relationship, it seems rarely to occur in fact Reference to the concept of fraud in parent-
subsidiary has generally been beside the point.
18. Thus, in Skelly v. Dockweiler, 75 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1947), minority share-
holders sued to enjoin a proposed merger of the corporation in which they held an in-
terest with another corporation controlled by the majority shareholder. The court apparently
disapproved of the suspected intentions of the plaintiffs, referring unfavorably at one point
to their failure to allege willingness on their part to sell their shares at a fair price, in
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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Where a decision for the plaintiff seems called for, however, precedent
requiring proof of "actual" fraud presents grave logical difficulties. Courts
have avoided these difficulties via the doctrine of "constructive" fraud.10 While
courts have proposed various definitions of this term,20 the results fail to fall
into a discernible pattern.21 The term has been characterized as "inept, ' "2
and at least one court has been frank enough to observe that it is nothing more
than a means of finding some way of imposing the liabilities attendant upon
a finding of fraud where there is no fraud in fact.23
Another concept derived from contract law often applied to parent-sub-
sidiary cases is the notion of good faith.24 Good faith, like fraud, refers to the
posture of a party engaged in the process of bargaining.25 Similarly, it signifies
in part, the truthfulness of disclosures of purpose, and even more than fraud
seems to impart exclusively subjective connotations. The term is also used
order to allow the consummation of the merger. The court denied the injunction, reasoning
that transactions between corporations could not be set aside unless actual fraud were found,
that no fraud was alleged or proven, and that, therefore, the proposed merger must go
through. Id. at 14.
19. Lytle v. Fulotka, 106 Okla. 86, 90, 233 Pac. 459, 460 (1925); Seagrave Corp. v.
Mount. 212 F.2d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Food Machinery Corp. v. Moon, 165 S.W.2d
773, 775 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
20. See Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 394 Ill. 94, 108, 67 N.E.2d 265, 275
(1946) ; Olitkowski v. St. Casimer's Say. & Loan Ass'n, 302 Mich. 303, 308-09, 4 N.W.2d
664, 667 (1942) ; Appeal of Eastman, 135 Me. 233, 236, 194 AtI. 586, 588 (1937) ; Epstein
v. United States, 174 F.2d 754, 766 (6th Cir. 1949).
21. The difficulty of gleaning from the various applications of the term a workable
definition may be gauged by reference to the black-letter attempt of CoR'us JuiUs SEcuN-
DuM: "Constructive fraud is most frequently found in a breach of duty arising out of a
fiduciary or confidential relationship; but the authorities are not entirely harmonious as to
when, for this purpose, a fiduciary or confidential relationship exists, and the rules laid
down for determining the question are not definite." 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 2(c) (1943).
22. Charleroi Lumber Co. v. Bentleyville Borough School Dist., 334 Pa. 424, 432, 6
A.2d 88, 91 (1939).
23. In re Bowen, 151 F2d 690, 691 (3d Cir. 1945) (Goodrich, J.):
[W]e said that fraud might be shown to void the release, going on what tcemed
to us . . . the almost universal analogy as to the effect of fraud in transactions
generally.
Proof having failed to show actual fraud . . . , we are now asked to say that
something else will do. That something else is made to sound like fraud by putting
the word "constructive" in front of it. No better illustration could be found of the
dangers involved in the slippery use of language. Constructive fraud, of course, is
not fraud at all as both lawyers and laymen know and understand the term, but
conduct which the courts regard as liability creating and which, therefore, has some
of the consequences which actual fraud has.
24. See, e.g., Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) ; Acme Mines Dev. Co. v. Clawson, 66 Utah 103, 114-15,
240 Pac. 165, 169-70 (1925).
25. In the context of the bargaining process, good faith has always meant the contrary
of fraudulent intent. See, e.g., Tapia v. Williams, 172 Ala. 18, 29, 54 So. 613, 617 (1911);
Stark v. Starr, 22 Fed. Cas. 1084, 1088 (1870); Docter v. Furch, 91 Wis. 464, 476, 65
N.W. 161, 164 (1895).
[Vol, 74:.338
CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE
in reference to various types of otherwise undefined conduct, especially ob-
servance of relevant trade practices. 26 To the extent that historical and logical
ties bind the concept of good faith to the law of contract, the notion is con-
ceptually unsuited to a situation where there is no bargaining. In the same
vein, since disclosure is rarely an issue in parent-subsidiary cases, application
of good faith principles requiring disclosure is both unnecessary and misleading.
Moreover, its emphasis on subjective motivation makes the existence or non-
existence of the concept difficult or incapable of demonstration.27 For these
reasons, and because of its utility as a catch-all, the concept of good faith has
been employed in the case-law of parent-subsidiary disputes chiefly as a
make-weight to reinforce a court's disapproval of defendant's objectives, par-
ticularly the acquisition or extension of corporate power, or the total elimina-
tion of minority interests in the subsidiary. -
Finally, the bankruptcy of analysis based on the model of the contractual
transaction is manifested by the rule, stated emphatically in the leading cases
in the field, that the burden of proving the fairness of a challenged transaction
is on the defendants.2 9 The emphasis placed upon this procedural considera-
tion has elevated it to the status of a substantive rule of law. Its effect is not
merely to shift the burden of going forward with the evidence in a procedural
sense,30 but to place on the defendant the difficult task of constructing a ra-
tionale which will satisfy the trier of fact that the transaction was fair.3 1
26. See, e.g, U orromR ComnRaAc.L CODE § 2-103 (1) (b).
27. Cf. Note, 61 H Rv. L. REv. 335,340 (1948).
28. See notes 46 and 49 infra and accompanying text. See, e.g, Pepper v. Litton, 303
U.S. 295 (1939) ; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. New York & N.XR.R, 150 N.Y. 410, 44
N.E. 1043 (1896). Conversely, the term is employed in justifying dismissal of a claim
challenging conduct demonstrating objectives less far-reaching and methods less brazen.
See, e.g., Acme Mines Dev. Co. v. Clawson, 66 Utah 103, 114-15, 240 Pac. 165, 169-70
(1925).
29. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921); Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939). Indeed, this rule is the principal legal proposition for
which these cases are said to stand. See, e.g., Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp,
19 Ill. 2d 268, 282, 166 N.E.2d 793, 801 (1960) ; Annot, 33 A..1R2d 1060, 1072-73 (1954),
and cases cited therein.
30. Normally, the burden of proof falls on the party desiring to have the action taken
by the court, i.e., in almost all cases, the plaintiff. Shifting the burden to the defendant can
only be said to serve a genuinely procedural function when it operates to distribute equitably
the task of introducing evidence of facts relevant to the claim. Thus, the burden is shifted
to the defendant where relevant information is exclusively within his kmowledge or pos-
session, or where the plaintiff has a negative assertion to prove, such as non-performance
of a condition in a suit for breach of contract. See 9 ,VIGsoRE, EvrinacE § 2486 (3d ed.
1940).
31. For discussion of the analytical problems presented by the Geddes rule as to the
allocation of the burden of proof in corporate fiduciary cases, see Even v. Peoria & FR ly.,
78 F. Supp. 312, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). There are cases which purport to hold, contrary to
the Geddes rule, that the plaintiff has the burden of proof. But see Ward, stpra note 4, at
116. Other cases hold that, before the burden can be shifted to the defendant, prima facie
evidence of unfairness must be shown by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Mayflower Hotel Stock-
1964]
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When applied in conjunction with the elusive substantive rules used to mea-
sure fairness, allocation of the burden effectively decides the case, and relieves
the court of the necessity of articulating its reasons for finding for plaintiff.
Similar shortcomings have attended the application of the second principal
concept to which the courts have referred in testing the fairness of parent-
subsidiary transactions - the concept of the model corporate structure out-
lined by most corporation statutes. This concept presupposes that the groups
within the corporation actually conform to the theoretical roles and rela-
tionships assigned them by statute. Thus, directors are envisaged as the in-
dependent managers of the corporation responsible for broad policy decisions
and answerable to the shareholders, who, in turn, are seen as a distinct group
capable of exercising effective supervision.32 The most direct application of
this model is found in the set of rules emphasizing the degree to which pro-
cedural formalities have been observed: was the challenged transaction ap-
proved by a disinterested majority of the board of directors?33 was the de-
cision made at a meeting legitimated by a disinterested quorum?34 was the
decision ratified by the shareholders ?3' To the extent that the actual structure
of power within the corporation deviates from these conceptual norms, the
logic of the doctrines derived from the statutory model loses its efficacy. Since
claims of breach of fiduciary duty arise only in situations where a single group
is majority shareholder of both coiprations, master of the directors and
officers, and, less frequently, creditor as well, the illogic of applying such
doctrines to the parent-subsidiary disputes is apparent.80 Indeed, the inap-
propriateness of these rules is so patent that the use of rules derived from
statutory structural and procedural norms has been increasingly rare and may
be considered of diminishing import.8 7
holders Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 721 F. Supp. 231 (D.D.C, 1947).
The impact of the weight given to allocation of the burden of proof on the quality of the
arguments of counsel for the parties is reflected by the remarks of Judge Steuer, dissenting
in Case v. New York Central:
A great part of the energy expended by counsel was in part an effort to show that
the burden of proving fairness or unfairness was on the other side, and each having
established (at least to his own satisfaction) that it was on his adversary, each
relied on the fact that it was impossible for the another to make the proof.
19 App. Div. 2d 383, 390, 243 N.Y.S2d 620, 627 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
32. The same presuppositions are given critical analysis with respect to doctrinal em-
phasis on shareholders' voting rights in Chayes, The Modcrn Corporatlon and the Rule of
Law, in MAsox, op. cit. supra note 2, at 40, and in Manning, Book Review, 67 YMX L.
1478 (1958).
33. Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587 (1876); Cowell v. McMillin, 177 Fed.
25 (9th Cir. 1910).
34. See, e.g., Parsons v. Tacoma Smelting & Ref. Co., 25 Wash. 492, 65 Pac. 765 (1901).
35. See, e.g., Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890).
36. For an example of the use of creditor status to destroy the interests of minority
shareholders in a subsidiary, see Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. New York & No, Ry.,
150 N.Y. 410, 44 N.E. 1043 (1896).
37. Compliance with such requirements as to the composition of the board of directors,
the quorum, and ratification by the shareholders will not immunize a transaction the results
[Vol. 74: 338
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A conceptual cousin of these dying doctrines, however, retains legal vitality.
This approach, denominated as the business judgment rule, concentrates, not
on formal decisional procedures, but on an idealized picture of the role of
the management group and on the cast of mind which marks their approach
to that task. The rule states that courts will not interfere in the management
of corporations and will not upset decisions made by directors or officers as long
as the latter act on the basis of honest business judgmentas Underlying the
rule are the assumptions that the direction of a corporation is a job requiring
expertise and experience and that courts making after-the-fact judgments
are apt to overlook the difficulties involved in the actual process of decision.P0
Although these assumptions are not inaccurate in themselves, they do not,
without more, constitute a workable basis for a rule of decision, for they
yield no means of making distinctions; to state merely that courts should
rarely interfere gives no clue whatsoever as to when they should or should
not interfere. The requirement of honesty is designated as the element on
which the distinction rests. But, being a subjective element, it suffers from
the same definitional and evidentiary infirmities as good faith ;40 and, referring
to the factor of disclosure, it is generally as irrelevant to the real issues in
parent-subsidiary cases as are concepts of fraud.4 ' As a result of these defects,
the business judgment rule has been used in the case-law principally as a
means of escaping, rather than aiding, analysis.
In some recent cases, the business judgment rule has served courts discom-
fited with the arm's length test where its imperatives seemed to compel the
wrong result.42 When these cases are examined with reference to their his-
of which are deemed unfair. See Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co, 109 Cal.
App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952); Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App.
2d 157, 260 P.2d 823 (1953) ; Wiseman v. United Dairies, Inc., 324 Mich. 473, 37 N.W.2d
174 (1949). Still, compliance or non-compliance with such requirements is not without
weight in some courts. See Lewis v. Hat Corp. of Am., 38 Del. Ch. 313, 150 A.2d 750
(1959); Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co, 145 Colo. 413,
359 P.2d 665 (1961). An assessment of the remaining effect of such rules appears in
1 HoRNSTEIw , CoP.PonRAox LAw A.D PRacrTcE § 439 (1959).
38. See, e.g., Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E2d 18 (1942), discussed in note
41 infra; Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 48 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) ; Price v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 55 N.Y.S.2d 890, 896 (Sup Ct. 1945).
39. Marony v. Applegate, 266 App. Div. 412, 426, 42 N.Y.S.2d 768, 782-83 (1943).
40. See notes 24-26 spra and accompanying text.
41. See text following note 17 supra.
42.. For e-axmple, in the case of Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942),
a dispute arising out of the financial woes plaguing the Long Island Lighting Co. system
during the depression years, the court applied the business judgment rule in deciding against
plaintiff's claim. The particular transaction challenged was a series of short-term loans"
made by the partially controlled Empire Power Corporation to the parent, Long Island;
as the loans had fallen due, they were not repaid, and the directors of the creditor-sub-
sidiary, also the directors and sole shareholders of the debtor-parent, renewed them. The
court, speaking through Judge Lehman, conceded that other alternatives had been open to
the Empire directors which would have been more consistent with the concept of an in-
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torical context and to the business facts giving rise to the legal dispute, they
illuminate the new developments which have made some courts unwilling
to follow out the logic of arm's length analysis. The first of these factors is
the development of economic integration of an extensive and refined degree,
as opposed to mere legal or managerial control. Such integration has tended
to magnify the structural inadequacies of the arm's length test.48 The use
of common executive staffs and identical equipment and facilities often pro-
ceeds to a point where the legal distinction between parent and subsidiary
becomes largely irrelevant to the business operations of the system. 44 And the
complex and continuing relationships generated by the economic integration
within such a system make it often misleading to test the fairness of an isolated
legal transaction without reference to its context. 4 Under such conditions,
application of arm's length principles may end in frustrating the objectives
which originally led both parties to enter into the relationship - pooling
of capital, centralization of management, division of function, and other econo-
mies of scale - which promise benefits, not only to the parties interested in
the two corporations, but to the national economy as well.
dividual entity protecting its interests. The court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim turned on
its application of the business judgment rule:
... however high may be the standard of fidelity to duty which the courts of this
State may exact, errors of judgment by directors do not alone suffice to demonstrate
lack of fidelity....
There are many matters disclosed by the record which cast doubt upon the pru-
dence, wisdom, and concern for the public interest shown by these directors ....
But the defendants can be charged with no wrong to the corporation . . . with-
out proof that they willfully failed to protect the interests of the Empire Power
Corporation ....
Id. at 232-37.
43. In Marony v. Applegate, 266 App. Div. 412, 422, 42 N.Y.S2d 768, 779 (1943),
the court rested its choice of the business judgment rule on the existence of "such circum-
stances," although it did not articulate the logic behind that decision. But see Chelrob v.
Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 460-61, 57 N.E.2d 825, 834 (1944).
44. See Marony v. Applegate, ,supra note 43, at 422, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79; Espach
v. Nassau & Suffolk Lighting Co., 293 N.Y. 463, 466, 57 N.E2d 835, 836 (1944).
45. Thus in Ripley v. International Rys. of Cent. Am., 8 App. Div. 2d 310, 319-20,
188 N.Y.S2d 62, 73-74 (1959), defendant United Fruit Co. argued that
the contracts are fair when not only the tariff rates are considered, but when all of
the other relevant factors are weighted - such as, essential financing, use of rail-
road equipment, availability of connecting carrier facilities, reduction of terminal
services, assurances of stable and substantial traffic volume....
The court gave extensive concern to this argument, but purported to reject it in affirming
the referee's award of damages to plaintiff subsidiary. However, in refusing to award a
much higher measure of damages based on comparison with the rates of other carriers, the
court, by implication, does appear to have given these factors some weight.
In Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64, 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), Judge Weinfeld
managed to fit consideration of analogous factors into application of the arm's length test.
He decided that if an independent corporation had found itself placed in an analogous
relationship, it could have accepted the terms of the challenged transaction.
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In addition to the consequences of economic integration, recent parent-
subsidiary cases have reflected the changes in the behavior of corporate con-
trol groups effected by a maturing economy and the pressure of government
regulation. Officers and directors charged with breach of fiduciary duties by
minority shareholders in subsidiary corporations are frequently no longer
guilty of attempting to extend their control or to eliminate totally the interests
of minority shareholders or of creditors&4 6 While defendants may be less
concerned with the interests of minority shareholders than would be an in-
dependent representative, their conduct is not capable of generating the sort
of intense indignation from the bench and the law schools which shaped much
of the current fiduciary doctrine 7 Contemporary defendants have tended to
be professional managers given erroneous counsel as to the limits within
which they could legally maximize the parent company's share of the fruits
of economic integration.48 In such cases, the objectives of management have
tended to relate to the allocation of costs and benefits between the corporate
units forming the system and the parties interested therein.40
In general, the response of the courts to these changes has been disappoint-
ing. Escape from the strictures of the arm's length test has been achieved
predominantly by manipulation of the traditional corporate fiduciary doctrines
and their conceptual bases8 0 Several courts have, however, adopted an ap-
46. Transactions motivated by such objectives amount to what is known as a "freeze-
out," a phenomenon less apparent today than in the 1920's and before. Professor Berle, in
reexaminng corporate practices recently, conceded that
the administrators of the corporations may have seen some light (possibly some-
where on the road to the Pecora Investigation or the Securities & Exchange Com-
mission) since 1933. The principles and practice of big business in 1959 seem to me
to be considerably more responsible, more perceptive, and (in plain English) more
honest than they were in 1929.
TuE CoRPoRAnoN o MoDZm SociETY xiii (Mason ed. 1959).
47. Compare the attitude evinced by the contributors to MAsoN, op. cit. Supra note 46,
especially Rostow, Chayes, and Berle, with Berle vintage 1932, supra note , and the re-
marks of Mr. Justice Stone in The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HAnv. L. Rsv. 1, 9
(1934).
48. This, perhaps, is one reason why courts are so anxious to avoid attaching to direc-
tor defendants subjective labels, such as "bad faith" or "dishonesty," which connote "freeze-
out' objectives. See, e.g., Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 448, 450, 57 N.E.2d 825,
833 (1944); Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942), discussed in note 42
supra.
49. Compare, e.g., Case v. New York Central R.R, 19 App. Div. 2d 383, 243 N.Y.S.2d
620 (1963), and Ewen v. Peoria & X. Ry., 78 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), with Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. New York & N.R.R, 150 N.Y. 410, 43 N.E. 1043 (1896), and
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
50. See examples and discussion, notes 14-15, 18, 3843 supra and accompanying text.
Another more imaginative use of the a7n's length test is the argument that, had the sub-
sidiary been independent in fact, its economic weakness would have precluded its obtaining
better terms. Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry., 78 F. Supp. 312, 337 (1948). Still another, no less
unfortunate, innovation is the rule that, where the subsidiary has sustained a "profit, ' no
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proach which can be viewed as a step, at least in the direction of relating legal
doctrine to business realities. This method utilizes a provision found in the
corporate charter of most large modem corporations, authorizing the corpo-
ration to deal with other companies in which its directors and officers are
interested.51 The source of this approach appears to be the case of Spicgel v.
Beacon Participations, 1C.52 In Spiegel, shareholders in a bank subsidiary,
the function of which was to provide the parent and its control-group with
a vehicle for speculation, sued for restitution of losses incurred by the sub-
sidiary. The court refused to apply the burden of proof to defendants, and
emphasized the authorization clause in the subsidiary corporation's charter.A
The court interpreted the clause as
designed to permit interlocking directorates of a broad nature, and to
give wide power to each director.., to engage in behalf of the defendant
with other corporations and associations . . . provided the nature of his
interest was disclosed.'I
The court held that the provision exonerated directors with dual interests from
"adverse inferences which might otherwise be drawn against them."5 In a
suit questioning transactions between the New York Central and a subsidiary,
Judge Learned Hand used to similar effect analogous language included in the
original agreement signed upon the purchase of the subsidiary by the Central.60
Hand reasoned that the clause "presupposed" that the parent was to "deter-
mine the interests of both in those mutual transactions which would constantly
arise between the two."157 Hand also made a serious attempt to formulate
new doctrinal concepts explicitly derived from the facts peculiar to such in-
tegrated systems. Noting that the subsidiary was "part of a single railway
system, operated as a constituent unit after the conventional pattern in such
cases," he concluded that the arm's length test needed "further analysis" in
such a situation. s Rather, said the court, the applicable test ought to be
based on the manner in which Central would treat a "wholly owned division,"
matter how slight, and has not suffered a "loss," the challenged transaction must stand.
Cleary v. Higley, 154 Misc. 158, 163, 277 N.Y.S. 63, 78 (1934) ; Espach v. Nassau & Suf-
folk Lighting Co., 293 N.Y. 463, 466, 57 N.E.2d 835, 836 (1944). Since there is no quali-
tative distinction between a "loss" in terms of monetary assets, and the receipt of inadequate
consideration in an exchange, the rule is simply not a logical proposition. It is usually
ignored in cases where the difference between the value received and the fair value is very
great. See, e.g., Ripley v. International Rys., 8 App. Div. 2d 310, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1959).
51. O'Neal, Molding the Corporate Form to Particular Business Situations; Optional
Charter Clauses, 10 VAND. L. Ray. 1, 25-26 (1956).
52. 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937).
53. Id. at 412-13, 8 N.E.2d at 905.
54. Id. at 413, 8 N.E2d at 905.
55. Id. at 417, 8 N.E.2d at 907. Similarly, the court in Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y.
227, 234, 43 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1942), considered plaintiff's claim "against the background" of
such a clause and placed heavy reliance on its presence.
56. Ewen v. Peoria & . Ry., 78 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).




without regard to the presence of minority shareholders in the particular
complaining "constituent unit."5 9
Ultimately, the failure of the traditional fiduciary rules in the parent-sub-
sidiary context can be traced to the nostalgia which colored their promulgationco
an attitude exemplified by a leading exponent of the revival of strict fiduciary
principles in the early 1930's:
. . . the shareholder in the modem corporate situation has surrendered
a set of definite rights for a set of indefinite expectations. The whole
effect of the growth of the powers of directors and "control" has been
steadily to diminish the number of things on which a shareholder can
count; the number of demands which he can make with any assurance
that they must be satisfied.61
Although this was indeed a concise description of the problem to which fidu-
ciary doctrine was then, and continues to be, addressed, it does not follow
that the proper task of the law is to apply more ironclad definitions of those
same traditional "rights," clear on paper, but often irrelevant in practice.
It would seem more fruitful to define fairness, instead, in terms of the share-
holder's "expectations." "Indefinite" as they may be, these expectations should
provide a useful source of standards of fairness in parent-subsidiary cases in
two respects. In the first place, an attempt to gauge the fairness of a chal-
lenged transaction in terms of the expectations of the parties vill focus atten-
tion on their entrance into the relationship - the only point in time when it
is meaningful or relevant to look upon them as independent entities hammer-
ing -out an agreement by means of the bargaining process. It is then that the
terms of the relationship were set, and it is by reference to those terms that
the fairness of the transaction in question ought to be judged.G Secondly,
59. Id. at 317. However, Judge Hand only applied this test to decisions concerning the
"actual conduct of the business" operations; to the "division of the income and expenses"
he applied a different test, to the effect that plaintiffs had the burden of showing that an
independent corporation would not have accepted the terms dictated by defendants.
60. A sinilar nostalgia for the nineteenth century economic world may be perceived in
the formulation of the anti-trust laws. Their attempt to eradicate the external effects of the
concentration of corporate power concommitant with industrialization seems analogous to
the arm's length rules as they are applied to the internal government of the corporation.
Cf. ARNoLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPTrrAmms 211 (1937). Nostalgia for the era of the in-
dividual entrepreneur may also be behind the law's obsession with the shareholder's right
to vote as a means of checking the power of corporate control groups. Cf. Manning, mipra
note 32, and the remarks of Chayes, supra note 32, at 40:
The one explicit legal response in terms of structure to the big corporation has
nostalgically striven to reverse this process. It has consisted in efforts supported by
legislation, judicial decision, and more than a dash of sloganering, to restore mean-
ing to the shareholder's vote.
It is unreal to rely on the shareholder constituency to keep corporate power
responsible by the exercise of the franchise....
Ibid.
61. BE.Ri & MEA s, Tm AMoDEn COPORATiON AND PRIVATE Pnommrv 277 (1932).
62. To proceed from such a base would not be without precedent, as far as the actual
practice of courts is concerned. Indeed the emphasis of several courts on clauses authorizing
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the concept of the expectations of the parties provides the best medium for
taking into doctrinal account the structural realities of the particular relation-
ship presented in each case. The legal concept of expectations necessarily
refers less to the intent of the parties in the subjective sense, than to the ob-
jective nature of the situation in which the parties are involved.03 In assessing
the objective dimension of the parties' expectations, attention should be fo-
cused on the environment in which the original agreement was executed,04
and on the overall pattern of their relations since the commencement of the
relationship. 65 Fairness should be sought in the degree to which the particular
intercorporate dealings should be understood as a reference to the expectation of the parties.
In Everett v. Phillips, for example, the court introduced its argument bearing on the
authorization clause with reference to testimony by a leader of the Long Island control-
group to the effect that the subsidiary in question was "formed for the purpose of financ-
ing and taking care of the various companies in which we were ... interested." Thus, the
court continued, the control-group "invited the public to subscribe to the capital of the
corporation which would be managed by directors in whose election no other stockholders
would have any part, and those who might furnish the capital which these directors would
manage were not left under any illusion that the directors, when acting for the corpora-
tion, would be free from other interests which might prevent an unprejudiced exercise of
judgment." 288 N.Y. 227, 233, 43 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1942). And the court in Eluen v, Peoria
& E. Ry. used the analogous purchase agreement emphasized in that case in an identical
fashion - as a manifestation of the intended nature of the relationship between the linked
corporations. 78 F. Supp. at 316.
,63. Cf. Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 913-
14 (1942) ; Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 743-44 (1919).
64. Thus the court in Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc. emphasized that the for-
mation and function of the subsidiary in question in that case was "similar to many other
such corporations created in connection with banks within the last fifteen years with un-
limited powers of investment and freedom from administrative supervision. 297 Mass. 398,
412, 8 N.E2d 895, 905 (1937).
65. See the approach of Judge Hand, in analyzing the parties' intent in the Ezvetj case:
"When the 'Central' and the 'Peoria' declared their wish that both should 'be put under one
management,' they could only have meant that the 'Peoria' should be treated as though It
were a division of the 'Central' ... ." 78 F. Supp. at 316 (emphasis added).
For a suggestion that fairness be defined in terms of the concept of expectations in an
analogous context, see Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal
Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE LJ. 1327, 1359-61 (1958). The problem dis-
cussed by Wellington is the definition of the duty of fairness owed non-union employees
by a union selected by majority vote to represent all employees in collective bargaining.
Wellington argues that the standards to be applied should be derived from the realities of
collective bargaining practices, and concludes that the best medium for taking account of
these practices in a given situation is the concept of expectations. His suggested standard
would extend the objective dimension of the concept so as to base the test, not on the ex-
pectations of a reasonable man in the situation of the individual complainant in a particular
case, but on the expectations of the "employee-community.'
This question, whether or not to define expectations in terms of the situation of an in-
dividual complainant, is presented in a particularly acute fashion in the context of parent.
subsidiary disputes. Its answer depends on a policy judgment, relevant to all types of claims
of breach of corporate fiduciary duty, as to the general function of the shareholder's deriva-
tive action. If the action is viewed as a vehicle for policing corporate control-groups, then
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transaction, in the context of that pattern, conformed to the expectations of
the parties, as of the time when the relationship was entered into, or perhaps,
as of the last time when the complainant had a realistic chance of ending his
participation therein 60
In measuring the degree to which the particular transaction challenged
fits the parties' expectations, it is useful to distinguish between the result of
the transaction, the structure defining the parties' relationship, and the man-
agement determinations by which the decision was reached. 7 The result
of the transaction in question should be compared with that of previous trans-
actions between the linked corporations and with the allocation of proceeds and
costs contemplated by their original agreement: was the allocation to be fixed
the equities of the particular shareholder's situation are irrelevant to the validity of the
claim. All transactions detrimental to the subsidiary and inconsistent with the previous
pattern of relations between the two corporations give rise to liability. If, however, the
function of corporate fiduciary law is seen as providing a means of compensating undeserved
losses by individual investors, then the situation of the particular complainant is crucial;
if the changed course of dealing was initiated by the control-group before his purchase of
stock, recovery would be barred on the theory that the expectations of a reasonable man
buying stock at that time would not be inconsistent with the challenged transactions. (On
this theory, the former owner would be viewed as having selected sale instead of suit as a
remedy for the breach of duty to him.)
66. Where the transaction challenged does not comport with the expectations with
which the parties entered into the parent-subsidiary relationship, as illuminated by the
actualities of the relationship after its commencement, an authorization clause should not
sustain the directors against a fiduciary claim. Such would appear the correct interpretation
of Klopot v. Northrup, 131 Conn. 14, 37 A2d 700 (1944). In that case, Chief Justice alt-
bie held that an authorization clause did not justify the formation of a new corporation
with the capital of the complaining subsidiary, where the plaintiff-minority shareholders
were not afforded participation in the new corporation commensurate with that held in the
dissolved subsidiary.
Failure to make a timely objection by way of suit to a changed course of dealings with
the subsidiary should be treated as acquiescence on the part of the minority shareholders
in the new position of the subsidiary. In the event that the remedy of sale was not realis-
tically available to the plaintiff at the moment of the transfer of subsidiary control to the
parent, due to a consequent drop in the market value of his shares, the rule of Perlman
v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), will provide an opportunity of recovery. In the
unlikely event that control is purchased secretly or piecemeal by the new parent, no change
in the expectations of non-controlling shareholders would accompany the change of con-
trol, and hence no shifts in policy detrimental to the subsidiary will be condoned.
67. Since the management of the parent corporation is in effective control of both the
parent and the subsidiary, it is able to arrange the transaction as it wishes; hence it is
futile to look to the formal decision-making procedures, as evidenced by the legal record
of board meetings and the like, or to the degree to which "independent" directors or coun-
sellors appear to have participated. Nevertheless, inquiry along such lines is frequently sug-
gested as a cure for the confusion in fiduciary doctrine. See, e.g., Note, The Fairness Test
of Corporate Contracts will Interested Directors, 61 HAnv. L. Rzv. 335, 340 (1948). See
also proposal (2) advanced in 49 CoRNEm L.Q. 520, 532 (1964). In the parent-subsidiary
context, the only relevant aspect of the process by which the transaction was consummated
is the business reasoning and the accounting determinations by which the challenged
allocation figures were arrived at.
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or variable; if the latter, to what was it to be varied in proportion - the finan-
cial strength of the parent, 8 the success of the subsidiary's particular line of
business operations, 69 the success of the system as a whole ?70 In putting the re-
sult of the transaction into its structural context, reference to the conceptual
models of the contractual transaction and the statutory corporate structure
should be avoided. Real factors should be the focus of concern: the actual struc-
ture of decisional power over the business operations affected - to what
extent was the management of the subsidiary to be merged with that of the
parent; 71 the functional relationship of the corporations - for example, was
the subsidiary's role to insure the parent with a steady supply of raw ma-
terials or to provide the parent with financial bacldng for speculative ven-
tures ?72 Finally, use of the expectations of the parties as a measure of fair-
ness should obviate all need to utilize burdens of proof as a means of avoiding
analysis. Attention should only be paid to the allocation of the burden of
proof when some genuine procedural function is served thereby.
78
Case v. New York Central R.R.74 provides an opportunity to examine the
application of the analysis outlined above to a particular parent-subsidiary
dispute. Comparing the challenged transaction to an arm's length bargain,
the majority reached the conclusion that the intercorporate agreement was
unfair.7r However, the dissent, written by Judge Steuer, reflected a concern
for the actual financial relationship between the two corporate entities. The
subsidiary was analogized to a "landlord ...whose only function has been
to receive the rent which the Central guaranteed to [it.]" On the basis of
this analysis the dissenters concluded that "the principle of equity by which
it becomes entitled to [an outcome of paying no taxes and retaining all the
savings] escapes us."
'76
68. Such appears to have been the case in Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d
18 (1942).
69. In Mardel Securities, Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 183 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Va,
1960), the claim of a complaining subsidiary newspaper company was granted by the court,
where the profits from its own sales were siphoned off to the defendant parent.
70. Such appears to have been the case in Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 298
Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937).
71. The best treatment of this question is in Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry., 78 F. Supp.
312, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See also Marony v. Applegate, 266 App. Div. 412, 421-22,
42 N.Y.S.2d 768, 779 (1943); Everett v. Phillips, 288 I.Y. 227, 233, 43 N.E2d 18, 20
(1942). Cf. Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 452-53, 57 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1944).
72. See Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 298 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937).
73. E.g., As when the defendant directors have sole access to corporate records relevant
to the issues in the case. See notes 30 & 31 supra.
74. 19 App. Div. 2d 383, 243 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1963). The case has been the object of
considerable law review commentary, all of it favorable to the decision of the Appellate
Division. 77 HARV. L. REv. 1142 (1964); 62 MICd. L. REv. 1451 (1964); 49 CORN mu
L.Q. 520 (1964).
75. 19 App. Div. 2d at 387, 243 N.Y.S2d at 625.
76. Id. at 388, 391, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 625, 627-28.
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Both the analysis and the result of the dissenting opinion appear more
satisfactory than the majority viewpoint. The question presented by the case
is that which the minority opinion appears to be attempting to answer: are
the expectations of the plaintiffs, as parties to the relationship of their corpo-
ration to the Central and its system, violated by the challenged agreement?
The accuracy of the dissent's picture of that relationship is patent. The sub-
sidiary, which occupies no office space and has no employees, has surrendered
all control over its business and financial operations to the parent.7  Under
the perpetual lease agreements -signed at the inception of the relationship
eight decades ago, the Central is the lessee of all the subsidiary's properties
and railroad equipment; in return the subsidiary receives all operating ex-
penses and forty percent of the gross earnings derived from the operations. 78
These terms provide the minority shareholders in the subsidiary with a sub-
stantial and stable dividend income.79 In sum, the minority shareholders might
be more realistically thought of as debenture holders, assured of a fixed return
on their capital, regardless of the net profits of the Central system; in this
posture they should have no reason to expect participation in any tax savings
resulting only in an increase to net income of the integrated business. In
light of these circumstances, the better conclusion of the case is that the ex-
pectations of the parties to this relationship were not violated by the chal-
lenged agreement, so as to justify court imposition of a more equal allocation.P
77. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 15.
78. 19 App. Div. 2d at 384, 243 N.Y.S2d at 621.
79. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, pp. 3, 16. Over the past twenty-one years, the sub-
sidiary recorded between $1.457 and $3.029 million before-tax profits.
80. Since the specific standards proposed in this Note are keyed to the structure of
the parent-subsidiary relationship, it is probable that they would prove of little use in
governing other contexts of self-dealing by control-groups. However, the criticisms of
many of the present rules discussed herein apply to their use in other contexts as well,
especially the emphasis on the allocation of the burden of proof or on subjective motivation,
in terms which are imprecise and conceptually inappropriate, such as "honesty," "good
faith," and "fraud."
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